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JURIES, BLINDNESS, AND THE JUROR FUNCTION
D. NOLAN KAISER*
Come now, with all your powers discern how each thing
manifests itself, trusting no more to sight than to hearing, and no
more to the echoing ear than to the tongue's taste: rejecting none of
the body's parts that might be a means to knowledge, but attending
to each particular manifestation.
-Empedocles of Agrigentum (484-424 B.C.)
Jury service is a duty for most, but privilege for a few. This fact
escapes lawyer and laity alike, for they conceive it as a duty; the lan-
guage of street and statute confirms this fact, as it is universally spoken
of as "jury duty." Yet, there are those who because they are denied the
opportunity to discharge this civic duty perceive it as a privilege.
In this paper I critically examine the confused legal practice of
excluding blind persons from jury service. Historically, blind persons
do not appear among any set of "twelve good men of the neighborhood
called to jury," nor, are they considered "peers" within the meaning of
that term as contained in the prevailing interpretation of the sixth
amendment jury guarantee. Since I accept as a given the moral and
legal validity of using lay persons to find the facts of a case, I seek to
provide criteria for the concept "peer" which will include blind per-
sons. Proposing blindness as a quality exempting jury service, I con-
tend that a blind person should be able to claim or waive this right at
choice. He can assess the credibility of testimony without seeing facial
expressions, gestures, and other body language signs. He can receive
and reasonably weigh material evidence including documents, signa-
tures, photographs, and maps. The perfectly autonomous juror who
receives all the admitted evidence, rationally weighs it according to in-
structions and arrives at verdict is not just mythic, he is not even an
ideal which our system of justice prizes. Many of the standard powers
and functions of the judge plainly show juror and metajuror features.
When these features are conjoined with bench trial, and are seen
against the sociological reality that some judges, like some lawyers, are
blind, the continued legal practice of disqualifying blind persons from
jury service is logically inconsistent.
* Professor of Philosophy, Central Michigan University. Professor Kaiser is blind, and was
recently excluded from jury service for "cause" due to his blindness. This article was written after
that exclusion. Recently, in March, 1984, Professor Kaiser was finally allowed to sit on a jury.
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I here provide a number of epistemic, legal, and moral considera-
tions designed to encourage the legal community to rethink its uncriti-
cal acceptance of the practice of disqualifying blind persons for jury
service.
I. PARTIALITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND JURIES
The symbol of justice through law is known to all: it is the statute
of a woman in flowing robes with her eyes bound by a cloth and hold-
ing aloft an hypothecary's scale. The message is clear. Justice is blind.
She impartially applies the law, favoring neither one side nor the other;
the mighty and the lowly, the wealthy and the poor are all equal before
her seat of judgment.
It is the judge who occupies this seat of judgment and is an exem-
plar of legal knowledge. The causes brought in pleadings before the
bench are issues of conflict that breach the orderly operation of society.
Laws are the standard of social order. They may enshrine and protect
the dignity of persons. They may display a nice appreciation of polit-
ical democracy and the public interest. On the other hand, laws may
mis-distribute human rights, creating class distinctions. They may
cloak despotism in the robes of authority. In either case, the judge is
charged with managing the pleadings. He impartially applies and in-
terprets relevant points of law.
The jural setting, by custom and by design, creates the impression
in the citizen of austere and sober reflections. It elicits feelings of ven-
eration, and judges are perceived as larger than life size. Consonant
with this picture of solemn impartiality the judge is called upon to meet
standards of disinterested fairness not required by other institutions in
the social frame. He is expected to"step down" or "to remove himself
from the case" where he can be shown to have a special interest. "The
interest in the subject matter of the litigation which disqualifies a judge
is a direct pecuniary or property interest, or one which involves some
individual right or privilege, whereby a liability or pecuniary gain must
occur to the judge on the event of suit."'
If we turn from bench to bar to consider the role of litigants, we
find that the stylized search after justice encourages partiality. The liti-
gants, or more precisely, counsel for litigants, are special pleaders.
Consider a criminal trial. The prosecution and defense are advocates.
The prosecutor who surmises the defendant not guilty will vigorously
1. 48 C.J.S. International Law 79 (1947).
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advocate the reasonableness of the belief that he is. Defense counsel
who suspects, but does not know, that his client is guilty will vigorously
advocate the reasonableness of the belief that he is not. It is left for a
jury to render a verdict on the evidence and arguments.
Jurors are required to meet a set of qualifications initially formu-
lated in custom but generally given statutory status. A juror may be
disqualified for reason of prejudice, physical disability, relationship to
a party, expression of an opinion, conscientious scruples against a given
law, and so on. The selection process begins by a blind or random
selection of names from among a pool of citizens meeting certain com-
petencies. Such competencies include citizenship, residency, age, and
language. From among the veniremen so selected there is a blind or
random drawing of names for prospective jurors. It is from among
these prospective jurors that any actual petit jury is seated.
Justice requires that the judge and juror be impartial while expect-
ing litigants to be special pleaders. These seemingly incompatible
threads in the fabric of justice are given play in the permissible chal-
lenges against seating prospective jurors.
A challenge for cause is a vote against seating a prospective juror
for a reason which the court hears and weighs. The paradigm instances
precipitating such challenges are prejudice, disability, and relationship.
A second variety is the peremptory challenge. Unlike the preceding,
peremptory challenges are limited in number. Each side has the same
number of such challenges, thus once again the system seeks justice
through impartiality of treatment.
The distinguishing feature of the peremptory challenge is that no
reason must be given which the court hears. Of course a challenge for
"no reason which the court hears" is not a challenge for no reason sim-
pficiter. These covert reasons may be as rational or irrational as the
mind of man can conceive. The motive is to advantage one side at the
expense of the other. While there are permissible reasons buttressing
challenges for cause which are prima facie rational and morally defen-
sible, it is also plausible that at least some of the reasons prompting
peremptory challenges are irrational and morally indefensible.
The theoretic basis of "challenge for cause" immediately rests
upon impartiality as a requirement of justice and mediately upon a set
of policy considerations collectively aiming at willingness, ability, and
good character. The theoretic basis of the peremptory challenge rests
upon a requirement of justice which declares that two sides given equal
opportunity to act on their own behalf will cancel one another's partial-
193
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ity. In this way it is believed that a jury so empaneled will likely be
neutral and offer no clear advantage to one side or the other.
The criminal defendant has the right to trial by jury of his peers.
This very feature of "trial by peers" suggests a mistrust of a profes-
sional cadre who is expert in the law and experienced at fitting fact to
law. Since defendants ordinarily come from the people, it is the sys-
tem's preference for the people to render judgment on one of their
own.2 In the past, the intimacy of communities made it impossible to
discover persons who did not know the defendant or the facts of the
case. Hence virtue was made of necessity, and jurors were expected to
know the person and character of the defendant and facts of the case. 3
This built-in partiality was moderated by a selection of good men
whose steadfastness as citizens could be presumed to preserve as much
objectivity as their first-hand knowledge would permit. In a word, the
system's aim was to procure good character and credible witness. By
the reign of Henry VI (1422-1471) the much prized petit jury replaced
the earlier modes of trial; petit jurors began to receive testimony from
witnesses though they continued to supply evidence of their own
knowledge. 4 This development at law was powerfully reinforced by
political and social forces already afoot in the land.
In the late 13th Century the movement toward enclosure of land
was given statutory recognition. From these beginnings it gained legis-
lative and social momentum, culminating in the Great Enclosure Act
of 1801. Whole populations were put on the road and all roads led to
the city. The expansion of mercantilism and later, manufactory, gave
the swelling urban population an economic base for survival.
With increased numbers came anonymity. No longer was it neces-
sary to acquire evidence at the expense of impartiality; both were now
possible. Witnesses continued to provide evidence; jurors continued to
provide verdicts, but these different functions were now performed by
different persons. As the legal system evolved into its present manifes-
tation, the juror became the deliberative decisionmaker with which we
are familiar. The juror's decision-making role involves a fundamental
2. The law of evidence is a body of exclusionary rules designed to control the entrance of
evidence on fact at issue in a trial. That the judge can exclude evidence from the jury on grounds
of prejudice or confusion shows a countervailing bias against the objectivity and rationality of
persons of the jury.
3. In the 11 th Century A.D., the Norman practice of relying upon persons of the neighbor-
hood to make accusation was imported into England. The early juror was accuser and witness
against the defendant, though the verdict in the baronial courts was rendered, not by a juror, but
by ordeal or combat. See L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 7-9 (1975).
4. See generally A. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS 51 (1956).
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process of perceiving the courtroom events of a trial. But there is noth-
ing which requires that this perception be, among other things, visual.
The real issue is whether a blind juror can perform this process of per-
ception effectively.
II. "OF ONE'S PEERS"-THE BLIND JUROR AS JUROR
In the sixth amendment of the Constitution persons accused of a
crime are entitled to speedy and public trial by jury. Constitutional
interpretation has firmed; it was thought that juries ought properly to
reflect the multifarious classes and subclasses in the wider society de-
spite the rampant prejudices of these classes. Such defects were moder-
ated by the fact that membership in such classes was neither fixed nor
exclusive. Since the accused has been charged with the commission of
a crime against the laws, a jury which is a reasonable facsimile of the
society at once meets the needs of society and of the defendant. Thus,
the right to a trial by a jury of one's peers can be understood as a right
to a jury selected from a pool of citizens which is a microcosm of the
important classes and subclasses which constitute the society.
If today, disabled persons are systematically excluded from juries
as women and blacks were in the past, on the footing they impede or
defeat the fair and efficient administration of justice, 5 then all defend-
ants, including defendants from these groups, are denied their right to a
trial by jury of their peers. The disabled person is a peer within the
intent of "a jury of one's peers" in a way that the automotive engineer
is not. The criteria for carving out peer groups from among all groups
in society minimally requires the group: (a) have an involuntary mem-
5. Referring to a blind prospective juror, Justice Christ writes in Lewinson v. Crews, 28
A.D.2d 111, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1967), affd., 21 N.Y.2d 898, 289 N.Y.S.2d 619, 236 N.E.2d 853
(1968):
In requiring "natural faculties" as a qualification for service on a jury the Legislature
may have considered not only the function of a juror, but also the effect his disability
would have on the orderly and practical operation of the court's processes. While this
factor alone would not support the construction we make, it is a pertinent consideration.
Id. at 114, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
Surely the ordinary blind person may be forgiven if he thinks the court's "pertinent consideration"
is a piece of impertinence. Courtroom operations are dramatically influenced by the personality
and work habits of the presiding officer. At times they leave the visitor with the impression of a
personal preserve and not a public place. The combination of judicial privilege and social defer-
ence has produced a staggering number of cases awaiting disposition. When the "time awaiting
trial" is credited against the sentence of a person convicted of a crime, a person acquitted of such
charge has in actuality served some part of a sentence never imposed. The response of plea-
bargaining to clogged court dockets is a further affront to justice and a necessary expedient to
prevent the "orderly and practical operation of the court processes" from collapsing. Though our
administration of justice may be threatened, it is not threatened by the special assistance which a
blind juror will occasionally need.
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bership; (b) be reasonably numerous; and (c) contain members who
individually or collectively pursue activities and goals which do not
significantly disrupt the operation of society and its major institutions.
In light of the preceding external criteria delineating peer groups it
becomes incumbent that we provide an internal criterion tied to the
concept of a defendant's rights. When selecting jurors, a defendant has
a right to the attitudinal and experienced perspective of a group if and
only if it (a) satisfies the three external criteria, and (b) its perspective is
unique, not provided by any other peer group or combination of peer
groups. In the case of disabled persons, their unique history of being
treated as non-persons in pure isolation from one another creates a per-
spective that cannot be replicated by any other disadvantaged group or
combination of groups in our society.
In the recent past families had their resident cripple conveniently
set in a corner of the room, but outside the mainstream of family activ-
ity. They were in the family but not of it. They were noticed only
when they no longer occupied their accustomed place. Their very disa-
bilities kept them in isolation from one another. Even the reservation
or the ghetto provided for cultural identity and individual achievement,
but a "shut-in" was shut away from normal society and was kept away
from fellowship with his fellows. The one stark and dreadful exception
to what is here described was the asylum in which mental and physical
misfits were stored in unholy amalgam.
In the recent history of the civil rights movement the disabled were
the last to organize. They were the last to achieve civil rights, the last
to secure a full participation in the economic, educational, and legal
spheres. Disabled persons are not thought of as lazy, shiftless, or indo-
lent; they are not condemned as social parasites; they are not, because
they are genuinely believed to be parasites. They are perfectly depen-
dent beings. It is from this unique and disabling history that disabled
persons in general and blind persons in particular will receive evidence
and render verdicts on their fellow citizens. The very fact that women,
native Americans and blacks are commonly accepted as jurors in a way
that the blind, deaf and those of impaired mobility are not is evidence
of what is here alleged.
The Requirement of Natural Faculties
Most state jurisdictions hold fast to the requirement and the lan-
guage of "natural faculties" in the determination of jury service. By
reference to these statutes and prevailing interpretations, blindness is
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not merely prima facie evidence of the absence of natural faculties, it is
conclusive. Blindness is straightforwardly a disqualification. Despite
the dominion of this interpretation, there is good reason for thinking
that a blind person who consistently exercises his political franchise
and is otherwise qualified as a juror, will not be so severely disabled as
to pose a clear impediment to the fair and efficient administration of
justice.
It is this dawning awareness which has prompted the California
State Assembly to amend the California Civil Procedure Code6 to al-
low the blind to serve as jurors. The blind person becomes the excep-
tion to the received view that jurors must possess all their natural
faculties. Under this amendment the law has moved from no blind
person may be a juror to any blind person may be a juror, other things
being equal. Courts, sensitive to the concern that motivated the
amendment, are nevertheless on the cutting edge of law's application to
society, and have sought to preserve grounds for a rational objection to
some blind persons serving as jurors.7 On the one hand the court will
not allow blindness simpliciter as cause for challenge, this after all is the
received view; on the other it will allow a blind prospective juror to be
challenged for cause on the ground that his blindness would defeat a
litigant's right to fair trial. It seems to require the articulation of some
specific way in which the blind juror's blindness would thwart justice.
This simply is the received view in different dress and despite the purity
of motivation, the reasoning has moved in a circle. Here we have ar-
rived at the boundary of law. The legislative intent is to allow the blind
to serve as jurors, and the judicial intent is to preserve the possibility of
offering a rational objection to such service.
The difficulty issues from the form of the ratio decidendi. By its
very nature it transcends the case which gives rise to it and constrains
an indefinite range of possible future cases. Yet the need is to ration-
ally object to this particular blind person performing as a juror in this
particular case. The particularity of the need is antithetical to the
universality of law. Are we arrived at a point where to avoid circular-
ity of reasoning borne of the logic of the law we must escape its sphere
altogether? Shall we have recourse to something analogous to equity
6. See CAL. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE § 205(b) (West 1977). This change is not, however, a
complete victory for potential blind jurors. Section 602(2) of the Code still allows a challenge for
cause for hearing impairment or other physical infirmity.
7. When as a district judge he was called upon to hear the case of four blind petitioners,
Justice Warren Ferguson, of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said that, "regardless of the
amendment, there need only be a 'rational basis' for excusing the blind." See Winter, Should
Deaf Blind Serve as Jurors, 66 A.B.A.J. 133 (1980).
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proceedings where the governing conventions tailor interest to fact ac-
cording to some finer sense of justice?
Lewinson v. Crews And Credible Testimony
If we take blindness as an exemption from jury service, the blind
prospective juror is no longer disqualified on the motion of others; he is
exempt from such duty on his own motion, for the exemption of blind-
ness becomes a personal privilege to be claimed or waived by him
whose privilege it is. 8 On W. N. Hohfeld's analysis reducing all legal
relations to one among a set of four rights and their reciprocals, 9 blind-
ness as an exemption from jury duty becomes a privileged right whose
reciprocal is such that neither party nor court has the right to demand
that it be claimed or waived. It is also clear that the status of jury
service on this showing is a right for the blind and a duty for persons
with their natural faculties. We thus avoid confusing rights and
duties. 10
Does affording blindness exemption status infringe upon a party's
right to fair trial? Referring to blindness as a personal privilege which
if waived cannot be cause for challenge after waiver, Justice Christ in
Lewinson v. Crews declares, "It is not an adequate protection to say
that he [a party] may challenge the blind juror on the voir dire for if we
hold blindness not to be a disqualification under the statute, a chal-
lenge for cause will not be available thereafter on that account. A per-
emptory challenge would be still available but these are limited in
number and they are an important right possessed by a litigant; he
should not be made to resort to such challenges in order to preserve his
right to fair trial.""I It is only unfair for a litigant to be constrained to
8. "[Juror's] exemption is a personal privilege, with which parties to the cause have no con-
cern, and which furnishes them no cause of challenge. . . [a] Juror may assert or waive his privi-
lege of exemption. If he assert [sic] it, the court would of course excuse him, and if he waive [sic]
it, the parties have no ground of complaint." State v. Albert, 125 Me. 305, 133 A. 693-94 (1926).
9. W. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
10. Commonly when jurists and lawyers discuss blind persons and jury duty as a constitu-
tional issue the talk turns to the constitutional right to do one's duty. "The statute must be consid-
ered in the light of the constitutional purpose to diffuse the right and duty of jury service
throughout the whole citizenry." Lewinson v. Crews, 28 A.D.2d i1, 115, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87
(1967) (Hopkins J., dissenting). It is the merit of making blindness an exemption to jury service
that we avoid such category mistakes.
11. Lewinson v. Crews, 28 A.D.2d 111, 115, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86 (1967) aftd, 21 N.Y.2d 898,
289 N.Y.S.2d 619, 236 N.E.2d 853 (1968). It seems apparent that the statutory construction by
Justice Christ is a correct reading of the legislative intent. It is equally apparent the Appellate
Court's construction exhibits that same blindness about blindness so rampant in society. In this
case it is more difficult to uncover as it is glossed by an authentic concern for litigant's right to fair
trial.
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use his peremptory challenge against a blind juror for cause of blind-
ness if it can be independently established that the full power and com-
pleteness of a party's case cannot be adequately appreciated by a blind
juror because of his blindness.
The court, seeing the need to justify this claim of "unfairness to
parties," states that
[a] litigant who comes before the Bar of Justice, whether in a crimi-
nal case or in civil litigation, wishes to have the impact of his evi-
dence fall with its full weight upon the jury, if there be a jury trial. If
his evidence or exhibits are not understood or the force of his interro-
gation of witnesses is lost, he will not have been afforded his full
rights. 12
In a preliminary way, it should be noted that if by the use of the
term "force" Justice Christ meant "logical force," then the force of an
interrogation has little if anything to do with the body language re-
sponses of witnesses; it has everything to do with the selection of ques-
tions and their collective logical relationship to crucial aspects of the
case. This is the most natural way to read this term given Justice
Christ's antecedent claim that evidence or exhibits not understood fail
to function as premises to a desired conclusion. If the juror gives care-
ful and intelligent hearing to the thrust of the interrogation, the absence
of visual signs can remove sources of distractions to understanding and
objectivity.
This is an important and little appreciated point. The sighted
community categorizes persons in accordance with views and values
which if their basis were clearly understood then most sighted jurors
would be dismissed in voir dire on grounds of bias or prejudice.
Sighted jurors develop beliefs about defendants by observing their de-
portment and dress on and off the stand.' 3 They reinforce precon-
ceived ideas by studying the family and associates of the defendant.
They weigh testimony by watching the judge's facial expressions. In all
of these instances, that which proves to be a channel of information
facilitating understanding concurrently poses a clear threat to the ob-
jectivity of the information so acquired. On the other hand, what the
12. 28 A.D.2d at 113-14, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
13. [Theodore Koskof]. . . president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America,
said he 'philosophically supports' the idea of handicapped jurors but thinks they have
little chance of getting past voir dire. Koskoff said the blind . . . cannot detect subtle,
but often highly significant nuances in a witness' or defendant's . . . posture, dress or
other behavior.
Winter, supra note 7, at 133. The fact the blind juror does not see how a defendant is dressed does
not jeopardize that defendant's right to fair trial; it does jeopardize the defense counsel's effort to
package his product for the jury. The confusion in the heads of the legal community could
scarcely be made clearer.
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blind juror is supposed to lose in way of information he necessarily
gains in way of objectivity.
The fact that the blind juror does not see the accompanying facial
expressions, grimaces, gestures, and other bodily language cues com-
nionly relied upon by the sighted juror to assess credibility of testimony
does not deprive the blind juror of the ability to assess the credibility of
such testimony. The nervous tic or darting glance, the uneasy shifting
or revealing gesture is almost always accompanied by auditory corre-
lates, e.g., clearing the throat, pausing to swallow, voice quavering or
inaudibility due to stress or looking downward. The common belief
that one can more quickly disguise the voice than one can disguise bod-
ily language is an error. It is as reasonable to believe that a person who
does not appear to be lying can be discovered to be so by special atten-
tion to voice, quality and other auditory cues as it is to believe the
reverse.
Like the goddess of justice, perhaps jurors too should be supplied
with scarves to be worn throughout the proceedings. They would be
removed on those occasions where the evidence "must be seen." Of
course, the sighted legal community instinctually responds like their
sighted lay brothers, that any evidence which can be seen must be seen.
Every piece of visual evidence or individual exhibit is treated as if it
were a photograph. Let us therefore consider the visual evidence ac-
companying the testimony and examination of a fingerprint expert.
Evidentiary Testimony and Exhibits
Take as an example two sets of fingerprints. They are enlarged
and projected on a screen in a darkened courtroom. The first set is that
of the defendant taken on the occasion of his booking at police head-
quarters. "Now," entones a mythical assistant prosecutor, "compare
this set with the one on the right taken from the murder weapon. Look
especially at the left thumb and index prints from set one and compare
them with the same prints from set two. Do you see the obvious simi-
larity? Notice that interrupted line right here. Don't we have the same
interruption here in set two at this point here? Back off and look at the
entire contour of these pairs of prints. Aren't they something more
than obviously similar? Aren't they, ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
identical?" Under such circumstances what could a blind juror be said
to believe? I answer that he can believe precisely what the other jurors
have been encouraged to believe, namely that the fingerprints on the
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murder weapon from set two are identical to those of the defendant's in
set one.
The obvious difference that the sighted juror sees what the blind
juror hears is not ultimately a significant difference. The context of
evidential production is the open court. Here judicial circumspection
and the surveillance of opposed parties may be relied upon to warrant
the reasonableness of the belief that the evidence referred to and de-
scribed is the evidence seen. Thus, the only difference in the
probability numbers which may be assigned to the beliefs of the sighted
and blind jurors is the scarcely thinkable situation that this episode of
trial is an elaborate hoax perpetrated by bench and bar and designed
for the purpose of deceiving the blind juror. Since such a hoax is re-
mote to the point of absurdity the warrant for the beliefs of the sighted
and blind juror are proximate to the point of equivalence.
On the other hand, defense counsel on cross-examination of the
fingerprint expert might show by a working model that the canons of
correct procedure were likely not or could not have been followed to
obtain the particular fingerprint displays just presented. Possibly,
higher illumination or magnification of the prosecutor's evidence
reveals differences which opens doubt. He may introduce affidavits of
witnesses affirming that the defendant was handed the murder weapon
by a jail steward and asked if he had ever seen this gun before. De-
fense counsel will have discharged his duty "to go forward with the
evidence," but he has done so in a manner to which the uninitiated
lawyer and layman alike would contend that no grounds for reasonable
doubt have been established for the blind juror.
It may be equally or nearly as informative to feel a working model
as to see it. Counsel might provide a verbal analogue to the working
model which is itself an analogue to or instance of a theoretic schema.
A written or verbal question directed through the judge to witness or
counsel may well supply the missing link or links entitling inference.
Any rebuttable presumption, declaration, claim, or line of inquiry on
facts at issue which is not rebutted may be taken with increased assur-
ance of truth. It is the truth of this doctrine which gives a blind juror a
reliable ladder at which to arrive at the same plateau of belief at which
sighted jurors arrive through inspection. In a word, the opposing sides
in this judicial contest each provide visual surveillance and information
to a blind juror which sighted jurors provide for themselves. Moreover,
there is nothing erroneous about the conclusion which a blind juror can
infer by relying upon the partiality of the contending parties, the im-
partiality of the judge and other court officials, and the common, but
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not commonly noticed, audible responses of jurors to various pieces of
testimony, documents, and other evidentiary exhibits.' 4
The Autonomous vs. The Actual Juror-The Blind Juror
as Decision Maker
The ideally autonomous juror who receives, weighs and judges the
evidence independently of every other juror is a standard of perform-
ance which ignores the setting in which proofs are offered, the purpose
of sequestering juries, and the rough balance in the strength of cases
which go to jury trial. Juries are treated by legal practice as deliberative
bodies. The jurors are isolated from everyone and shielded from every
influence except one another. The jury which is seriously divided and
reports as much to the court is commonly ordered back to the jury
room to continue deliberations in hopes of arriving at the required una-
nimity or near unanimity for verdict. The court recognizes and encour-
ages debate and persuasion as appropriate to consensus. If perfect
autonomy were the juror ideal, it would remain so after the jury is in-
structed. And we would speak not about "jury deliberations" but
about "juror reflections." As it is, jurors are real, and the law is
realistic.
In many jurisdictions, documents or relevant passages are read
aloud by the offering party. Occasionally such pieces of evidence are
passed among jurors. Of course the blind juror, like all the jurors, will
have heard what his fellow jurors are now permitted to see. Should the
jurisdiction follow the custom of permitting opposing counsel to view
the document though it is not read aloud, what is inaccessible to the
blind juror in open court becomes accessible upon request during de-
liberations. Such pieces of evidence are given to the custody of the
jury, and reading can be provided by fellow jurors or a court official
directed to do so.
Two persons may be presented with the same visual and auditory
evidence and both may arrive at the same conclusion, which upon the
evidence selected, has the same probability of truth. Yet each empha-
sizes or attends to different pieces of evidence. The result is the same
and the probability of truth comparable. This can and presumably
does happen among sighted jurors.
The blind juror will likely emphasize and attend to different pieces
14. Gestures of astonishment, approval, or revulsion all have their auditory correlates. The
visually informative facial expression extends into other sensory realms--even a smile may be
heard.
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of evidence from those of his fellow jurors. It does not follow on this
count that his conclusions are less sound or probable than the conclu-
sions of his fellow jurors, some of whom will concur and others of
whom will contest his findings.
Where we have "still photographs . . moving pictures ...
mechanical objects which demonstrate working parts. . enlarged fin-
gerprints. . . diagrams upon a blackboard," 1 5 all apparently irreduci-
ble visual evidence, there is an alternative mode by which the truth of a
belief so immediately visually supported may be mediately supported
by a series of beliefs and inferences from beliefs. It is this mode of
evidence acquisition and pattern of reasoning which may bring the
blind juror to a tentative verdict absent jury room deliberations. When
arrived at in the jury room, the shared inspection of evidence, the inter-
personally influenced weighting of the evidence and the rational and
critical exchange of beliefs among jurors may bring each of the jurors,
including the blind juror, to a verdict on the evidence.
III. JUROR ASPECTS OF JUDGESHIP IN NON-JURY TRIALS
The nonjury trial is not a nonjuror trial. The judicial juror man-
ages the pleadings, declares the law, and renders verdict. The trier of
law and the trier of fact have merged in one person. Historically, our
jurisprudence has distinguished these different jural functions. This
difference has been progressively exaggerated by the increasing sophis-
tication demanded of the judge and the ignorance of law demanded of
the juror. It is obvious that he who manages the pleadings ought to
know the law. It is less obvious why he who finds on the facts ought
not. Still, we need not search far to uncover plausible reasons. Since
jurors are drawn from a randomly chosen cross section of the people,
the juror trained in law is familiar with the personal and political moti-
vations given play in and about a trial. He has the training to persuade
most juries and the temperament to hang the remainder. There is a
better than even chance that the jury's verdict would be the legal juror's
verdict. Traditionally, the lawyer as juror is believed to pose a real
threat to the unbiased and thoughtful search after justice as determined
by persons who are presumed the equals of one another. Here
"equals" means "persons equally ignorant of the law." The actual ine-
qualities among jurors in the way of experience, education and charac-
ter are presumed to weight and counterweight one another in such
15. Lewinson v. Crews, 28 A.D.2d 111, 113, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83,85 (1967), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 898,
289 N.Y.S.2d 619, 236 N.E.2d 853 (1968).
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manner that the verdict is the product of as much reason and objectiv-
ity as a group of twelve randomly chosen persons can marshall.
In preliterate communities the judge was called upon to give judg-
ment. Commonly he applied law which was itself unspoken. This is
scarcely surprising since the unwritten law is inscribed in the heads and
hearts of those for whom it is intended. There is no declaration; there
is only rigid application to a well-defined range of repeating occur-
rences. The law's origin is traced to divine ordination, its reaffirmation
involves rituals of renewal and purification. It is that ethereal sinew
that preserves the integrity of the tribe and its privileged place in the
eye of the supernatural.
Early in our cultural childhood a judgment against the defendant
upon which the defendant defaulted was the ground which authorized
plaintiff or his kinsmen to seek remedy. ' 6 Often custom attached a spe-
cific remedy to specific injury, but it was soon discovered that such reli-
ance on "authorized self-help" guided by custom was an untrustworthy
procedure to assure social tranquillity. The remedy became articulated
in the verdict and eventually, the judge, or non-litigants authorized by
the judge were employed to effectuate remedy.17 In either case, the
archetypal feature of our "proto-law" experience is the verdict; it is
designed to repair the tear in the social fabric.
Modern jurisprudence fastens great importance on the distinct
functions of the judge and the jury; still, we show the imprint of our
origin. Before legislation, even before enforcement, the germ of all law
was the judge's decision. Though the separation between judge and
jury is well developed and defensible on grounds of justice and efficacy,
it is not a perfect separation. The lay juror never acts with the author-
ity or responsibility of the judge, but the judge is commonly required to
think and occasionally act as juror.
In the matters of preliminary fact finding and on parol evidence,
the judge has recourse to the same standards in determining admissibil-
ity as the jurors use in weighing and assessing evidence. When a later
oral expression bears on the claim that an earlier written instrument
16. See generally E. A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 52-53 (1967).
17. Referring to the Karimojong of Africa, Lucy Mair says,
The kin of a homicide have the recognized right to take a life or cattle in compensation,
and it is for them to judge how many cattle they should take. . . . But when one party
is determined on its rights and the other equally determined to dispute them, the matter
goes before a public meeting for discussion by everyone and decision by the elders. The
decision usually involves some payment in stock, and if the man who has been told to
pay does not do so, the elders send the younger men to take it.
L. MAIR, PRIMITIVE GOVERNMENT 94 (1970).
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does not fully integrate the provisions of an agreement, it is given to the
jury. When the oral expression is earlier and the written instrument is
later, it is given to the judge. The exclusionary parol evidence rule
applies. The jury takes the later oral expression as evidence in deter-
mining whether the earlier written instrument did fully integrate the
provisions of the agreement. The judge, seeking to determine an ex-
ception to the parol evidence rule in the matter of "fully integrating the
provisions of the agreement" will reason exactly like the jury. He goes
beyond the face of the written instrument to consult the earlier oral
expression as evidence of the intentions of the parties to the agreement.
Central to the judge's duty to determine whether the production
burden has been overcome by the offering party is an appeal to the
standard of "the rational juror." A piece of evidence is relevant when a
rational juror would come to believe that a particular fact at issue is
more probable than the fact appeared before the evidence in question
was introduced. Again, a piece of evidence is prejudicial when an ac-
tual jury without the evidence would be closer to a rational juror's state
of convincedness on the fact at issue, than the actual jury's state of
convincedness on that same fact when in possession of the evidence.
There is a sense in which the actual juror's reasoning when in posses-
sion of the evidence is a subset of the judge's set of considerations.
When we examine the reasoning and the status of the directed ver-
dict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict we uncover another di-
mension of juror activity within the sphere of the judge's responsibility.
In a criminal case when the evidence lines up in such manner that no
rational juror could doubt that the defendant is not guilty and no fur-
ther evidence is to be offered, the judge will render a directed verdict in
favor of defendant. When he does, he finds on the facts and so fore-
closes the opportunity for the jury to do the same. Even where he re-
fuses to render a directed verdict, though he does not perform as a
juror, he reasons as a juror, or more accurately, a metajuror. He deter-
mines that rational persons, on the basis of all the evidence adduced,
might reasonably dispute the facts of the case.' 8
In a civil suit, when the judge gives judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the grounds that the jury's judgment was contrary to law, he
reasons as a judge concerning issues of law but acts as a juror. When
18. Part of what I mean by "metajuror" is that the judge may be called upon to cast himself
as a hypothetical reasonable juror and then to reason about what such a juror would find or
believe about a given piece or body of evidence. The judge is thus required to hypothesize and to
be the hypothesized ideal. In this sense, the judge is performing the jural function and yet remain-
ing outside it.
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he gives the same judgment on the grounds that the jury's verdict was
excessive, contravening the most elementary standards of justice, he
reasons and acts as a juror. The logic of judgment is such that when
the judge reviews the evidence and sustains the jury's verdict, he acts
like the thirteenth juror.
Judge as Juror and the Blind Judge
In our legal system a defendant has the privilege of waiving his
right to jury trial. When he does, separate functions of separate judi-
cial organs expressly unite under the jurisdiction of the judge. In jury
trials judges will occasionally reserve ruling on motion to admit evi-
dence awaiting a clear indication of the propriety of its use. In the
nonjury trial the incentive to reserve ruling is aggravated by the addi-
tional responsibility on the judge to render verdict and the appellate
practice of sustaining judge rendered verdicts in the face of erroneously
admitted evidence. In this case the appellate court reasons that if the
admissible evidence which is admitted is sufficient to sustain the judge's
verdict, then the erroneously admitted piece of evidence or any evi-
dence upon which ruling is reserved does not appear in the judge's rea-
soning to verdict. In this matter the appellate court too finds itself
called upon to reason like a juror, or more exactly, a metajuror.
Regarding the erroneously admitted piece of evidence, it is judged
by the standard of "harmless error." It is "harmless" to the defendant's
right to a fair trial and verdict based upon the evidence if all the evi-
dence, absent the tainted piece of evidence, will nevertheless sustain the
verdict. It would be an extravagant expenditure of social resources to
declare a mistrial and so require a new trial to accomplish the old re-
sult. Curiously, an appellate court might invoke the same reasoning
and policy considerations to sustain the verdict in a jury trial under
identical circumstances. Surely this discrepancy in legal practice can-
not be sustained on the footing that when tainted evidence is admitted,
the judicial juror, unlike the lay juror, will not render a verdict which
relies upon that tainted evidence. It is folly to believe that he who cre-
ates the taint by erroneously adjudging it admissible for purposes of
verdict eschews its use in the verdict he renders.
One commonly recognized avenue of career advancement in the
legal profession is from bar to bench. Since judges are drawn from
among lawyers, some of whom are blind, it cannot be reason for aston-
ishment that some of our judges are blind. As we have learned, judges
are called on occasion to reason and act like jurors. It follows that the
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blind judge in acquitting his duties as judge will on occasion be called
on to reason and act like a juror. Since no prima facie case is made out
against the blind judge presiding over a jury or a nonjury trial by virtue
of his blindness, the legal custom of accepting the prima facie case
against the blind juror by virtue of his blindness is utterly without
merit.
CONCLUSION
The institutional bias of the law is transparent. The exclusionary
rules of evidence rest squarely upon a well developed, if not well ar-
ticulated, mistrust of the jury. The judge can prevent or reverse the
jury's verdict. The judicial juror's verdict is given preferential treat-
ment by the appellate court under select conditions. The pantheon of
values clustered behind the various legal structures and practices de-
scribed makes plain that the judge as judicial juror is sovereign and the
lay juror suspect. As for the blind juror, the law espouses beliefs about
the blind person as juror which are unwarranted and inconsistent with
existing legal practices. It would be an act of enlightenment for the
legal community and the several state jurisdictions to rethink their op-
position to the blind juror.

